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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
TRACY SALES, individually, 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs. 
STACIE PEABODY, individually and 
doing business under the assumed name 
of FINGERPRINTS DAY SPA, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
and 
LINDA COOK, individually, 
Defendant. 
SUPREME COURT NO. 41446 
ADA COUNTY CASE NO. 
2012-6516 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the 
County of Ada. 
HONORABLE MELISSA MOODY 
JAMES F. JACOBSON TRACYL. WRIGHT; DAVID W. KNOTTS 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT 
660 E. FRANKLIN ROAD, STE. 110 300 N. 6TH STREET, STE. 200 
MERIDIAN, IDAHO 83642 BOISE, IDAHO 83701 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
TRACY SALES, individually, SUPREME COURT NO. 41446 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ADA COUNTY CASE NO. 2012-6516 
vs. 
STACIE PEABODY, individually and APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
doing business under the assumed name of 
FINGERPRINTS DAY SPA, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
and 
LINDA COOK, individually, 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW Plaintiff by and throughout her attorney of record and hereby submits 
Appellant's Brief. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Tracy Sales filed a negligence action against Defendant Stacie Peabody dba 
Fingerprints Day Spa] ("Defendant") and now appeals the district court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Defendant on her negligence action. In Plaintiff's Complaint, she asserted 
two causes of action against Defendant, negligence and respondeat superior. (CR000006-
CROOOOll). On April 25, 2013, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment that purported 
to be dispositive of all claims against Defendant, but which addressed the respondeat superior 
claim only. (CR000025-CR000026; CR000035-CR000039). The district court granted partial 
summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claim for respondeat superior and allowed Defendant to 
submit an additional motion for summary judgment addressing Plaintiff's direct negligence 
claim. (CROOO 1 OO-CROOO 1 05). 
Defendant filed a second motion for summary judgment addressing the direct negligence 
claim on June 11, 2013. (CROOOI09-CR000112). On July 25, 2013, the district court granted 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the direct negligence action on the basis that (1) 
no genuine issue of material existed as to the element of causation and (2) the actions of Linda 
Cook, a defendant in the action who was dismissed after Plaintiff settled with her, constituted an 
intervening, superseding cause. (CR000319-CR000329). 
On August 7, 2013, Plaintiff moved the district court to reconsider its grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Defendant and submitted the additional affidavit of Dr. Jeffrey Chandler 
1 Fingerprints Day Spa is only an assumed business name and has no legal or juridical personality. Stacie Peabody 
is personally the defendant in this action and the Defendant on appeal. In the briefing that was submitted to the 
district court, Defendant was referred to in the plural as "Defendants" and that term was continued for the purpose of 
uniformity. However, Stacie Peabody is the Defendant. 
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and of counsel in support of that motion. (CR000334-CR000336). On September 3, 2013, the 
district court entered its order denying Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. (CR000363-
CR000368). In the order the district court acknowledged that a genuine issue of material fact 
existed as to the element of causation, thereby reversing its prior ruling, but then held that 
Plaintiff had not stated a cause of action for negligence against Defendant in her Complaint, 
which was an issue never raised by the parties previously. ld Judgment was entered on 
September 19,2013, and Plaintiff filed her notice of appeal on September 24,2013. (CR000369-
CR000374). 
Plaintiff went to Defendant's facility known as Fingerprints Day Spa on April 19, 2010 to 
have a pedicure performed. (CR000008). Defendant was the landlord of the premises on which 
Plaintiff was injured. (CR000028; (CR000023). In Defendant's facility there are several 
pedicure stations; each equipped with a foot basin that is filled with warm water that is used 
during the pedicure procedure. (CR000048). These pedicure stations and their attendant foot 
basins are owned by Defendant, as is the facility in which they are located. (CR000047; 
CR000049). 
Defendant is the licensed operator and self-identified owner of the facility. (CR000047). 
She is the owner of the pedicure station and foot basin in which Plaintiff was injured. 
(CR000049). She was responsible for ensuring that the facility's equipment, including the foot 
basins, were properly cleaned, sanitized, and disinfected. (CR000257-CR000258). Those who 
worked in the Fingerprints Day Spa facility understood that it was Defendant's responsibility to 
clean and disinfect the pedicure stations, including the foot basins. (CR000273). In fact, 
Defendant, at one point, specifically hired someone to clean the facility, including the pedicure 
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stations and their attendant foot basins. Id. Defendant was away from the facility for an extended 
period of three to four months straight during the spring of 2010, the time during which Plaintiff 
was injured. (CR000273; CR000050). While Defendant made some initial arrangement for the 
cleaning of the facility for a brief period during that spring, there is no evidence that Defendant 
provided for any type of regular cleaning and disinfecting of the facility during that spring. 
(CR000273). 
Defendant relied upon inspections from the Bureau of Occupational Licenses to 
determine whether their facility was being properly cleaned, sanitized, and disinfected. 
(CR000053). This abdication of responsibility by Defendant was unreasonable. (CR000257-
CR000258). Defendant had no knowledge as to what others were doing in sanitizing and 
disinfecting the facility at the time of Plaintiff's injury. (CR000052). 
Q. And, again, it's your testimony that you don't have any idea what the other 
technicians did with respect to cleansing or sanitizing equipment or these 
stations? 
A. No. I basically relied on the Bureau of Occupational Licenses to do their job 
and inspect each business owner and give their inspection results. Everyone had 
their own stations. They had their license at their stations. The State came in and 
inspected everyone yearly, sometimes twice a year. (CR000053). 
The only effort Defendant made to sanitize and disinfect the foot basins at the facility was 
to run the Let's Touch® product through the jets in the foot basins, which was done only in 
relation to clients she serviced. (CR000052). This use of the Let's Touch® product was contrary 
to the instructions contained on the product label. (CR000257). Use of an EPA registered 
product, such as the Let's Touch® product, contrary to its labeling instructions is a violation of 
federal law. ld. 
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Administrative rules promulgated and enforced by the Bureau of Occupational Licenses 
and the Idaho Board of Cosmetology require that facilities such as Defendant be under the direct 
supervision of a licensed operator. IDAPA 24.04.01.800 (12). Those same regulations place 
requirements on the licensed operator to ensure that the facility is properly cleaned and sanitized. 
Id. Defendant is the licensed operator and self-identified owner of the facility. (CR000047). 
She is the owner of the pedicure station and foot basin in which Plaintiff was injured. 
(CR000049). She bears the responsibility of ensuring that the facility's equipment, including the 
foot basins, were properly cleaned, sanitized, and disinfected. (CR000257-CR000258). 
Contrary to Defendant's testimony, the Bureau inspected Respondents's facility only once 
every two years. (CR000065 .. CR000071). Both in 2009 and in 2011, the Bureau's investigation 
found problems with the instrument sanitization at Defendant's facility. Id. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment m favor of Defendant 
Peabody on the basis that no genume Issue of material fact existed as to the causation 
between Defendant Peabody's negligence and Plaintiff's i~uries and damages. 
2. Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant 
Peabody on the basis that Plaintiff failed to plead a cause of action for negligence against 
Defendant Peabody. 
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ARGUMENT 
A. Defendant's Motion for Summary Jud2ment Should Have Been Denied Because 
Genuine Issues of Material Fact Exist As to Plaintiff's Claim for Ne2li2ence. 
The district court erred in originally granting summary judgment to Defendant on 
Plaintiff's claim for negligence in its order dated july 25, 2013. (CR000319-CR000329). In 
Count I Negligence in Plaintiff's Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that "Defendant, individually ... 
were negligent in ... failing to keep tools and instruments in a safe and usable condition to avoid 
injury or infection to Plaintiff and others for whom they performed pedicure procedures; and 
otherwise failing to maintain the premises, facility, equipment, and working conditions in a safe 
and reasonably prudent manner to avoid injury or infection to Plaintiff ... Plaintiff was injured 
and otherwise damaged as a direct result of the incident alleged herein, which injuries and 
damages were direetly and proximately caused by Defendant's negligence." (CR000008-
CR000009). 
The district court offer two bases for granting Defendant's summary judgment motion (1) 
that Plaintiff had not introduced facts to support causation and (2) that the prick or poke Plaintiff 
experienced at the time of the pedicure constituted an intervening, superseding cause. 
(CR000326, CR000328). 
Defendant's repeated failures, inaction, and abdication of responsibility for the proper 
cleaning, maintenance, sanitizing, and disinfecting of their facility, including the pedicure 
stations and foot basins, caused Plaintiff's injuries. (CR000095-CR000097). Defendant's 
negligence caused Plaintiff to suffer mycobacterial infection that resulted in severe injury and 
mUltiple surgical procedures. Id. The only facts in the record regarding causation are the opinions 
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of Dr. Chandler. Dr. Chandler's affidavits submitted on May 23, 2013, July 2, 2013, and August 
7, 2013, demonstrate (1) that Plaintiff's injuries of which she complains were caused by a 
mycobacteria present in the foot basin in which Plaintiff received the pedicure and (2) that 
Defendant's negligence resulted in the presence of the mycobacteria in the foot basin. 
(CR000092-CR000094; CR000264-CR000266; CR000342-CR000344). 
The district court determined that the term "the incident" as used by Dr. Chandler in 
expressing his expert opinions on causation was too vague or ambiguous. (CR000325). However, 
the reasonable inference to be drawn from Dr. Chandler's opinion, when read as a whole, is that 
Plaintiff's injuries were caused by the presence of mycobacteria in the foot basin in which 
Plaintiff received her "treatment" at the Salon, i.e. the pedicure that she received in the foot 
basin. (CR000268). On a motion for summary judgment, the Plaintiff, as the non-moving party, 
is entitled to all reasonable inferences in the record. 
The issue of the claimed inadequacy of wording of Dr. Chandler's causation opinions was 
brought up sua sponte by the Court. The issue was never briefed by the parties through two 
motions for summary judgment, and the Court only requested case law on the issue of causation 
from the parties after oral argument on the second summary judgment motion. A district court 
may not decide an issue not raised in the moving party's motion for summary judgment. 
Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, 126 Idaho 527, 530-531, 887 P.2d 1034 (1994); Silicon 
International Ore, LLC v. Monsanto Company, Idaho Supreme Court Case No. 39409, 
November 27, 2013. Plaintiff objected to the sua sponte raising of the issue regarding Dr. 
Chandler's affidavit. (CR000348). 
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In his affidavit filed on August 7, 2013, Dr. Chandler clarified the meaning of the words 
"incident" and "treatment" in his prior affidavit. (CR000342-CR000344). The term "incident" 
referred to the presence of mycobacteria in the foot basin in which Plaintiff received the pedicure 
at Defendant's salon. (CR000343). The term "treatment" referred to the placement of Plaintiff's 
feet in the foot basin at Defendant's salon, where Plaintiff's toe became infected with a 
mycobacteria.ld. With Dr. Chandler's additional affidavit, the district court acknowledged that a 
genuine issue of material fact existed as to causation. (CR000366). 
Again, the only facts in the record regarding causation are the opinions of Plaintiff's 
treating physician, Dr. Chandler. At a minimum, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the 
causation of Plaintiff's injuries. Thus, summary judgment as to Plaintiff's negligence claim is 
improper, and Plaintiff requests that this Court reverse the district court's grant of summary 
judgment as to her negligence claim against Defendant and remand for further proceedings 
consistent therewith. 
While the district court acknowledged that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to 
thc causation element of Plaintiff's negligence claim, it originally held, as a basis for granting 
summary judgment, that the actions of Defendant Cook constituted an intervening, superseding 
cause. (CR000326-CR000328). The focus of the district court's analysis was on the statement in 
Plaintiff's Complaint that she experienced a "puncture" on her big toe during the course of the 
pedicure, which pedicure was physically performed by Defendant Cook. (CR000008 - Complaint 
~ VII). Nowhere in Plaintiff's Complaint is it alleged that the hann or injury was solely caused 
by and could not have occurred without a "puncture." Id. Plaintiff only asserted that such 
puncture occurred. 
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The occurrence of a "puncture" during the course of the pedicure does not constitute an 
intervening, superseding cause as a matter of law. The following is a quote from the case of 
Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 204 P.3d 508 (2009) setting forth the outline of the legal 
precedents and standards governing causation, both actual and proximate: 
Proximate cause consists of actual cause and true proximate cause, which is also 
referred to as legal cause. Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284, 288, 127 P.3d 
187, 191 (2005). In other words, proximate cause "is composed of two elements: 
cause in fact and scope of legal responsibility." Sisters of the Holy Cross, 126 
Idaho at 1039,895 P.2d at 1232. "Actual cause is the factual question of whether a 
particular event produced a particular consequence." Newberry, 142 Idaho at 288, 
127 P.3d at 191. But true proximate cause focuses on whether legal policy 
supports responsibility being "extended to the consequences of conduct.... [it] 
determines whether liability for that conduct attaches." Id. (internal citations 
omitted) (quoting Henderson v. Cominco American, Inc., 95 Idaho 690, 695, 518 
P.2d 873, 878 (1973)). That is, "whether it was reasonably foreseeable that such 
harm would flow from the negligent conduct." Sisters of the Holy Cross, 126 
Idaho at 1040, 895 P.2d at 1233. This Court must decide whether the injury and 
manner of the occurrence are "so highly unusual that we can say, as a matter of 
law that a reasonable [person], making an inventory of the possibilities of harm 
which his conduct might produce, would not have reasonably expected the injury 
to occur." Id. at 1041,895 P.2d at 1234 (internal quotations and citations omitted) 
(quoting Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619-20, 619 P.2d 135, 137-38 (1980». 
The question of proximate cause is one of fact and almost always for the jury. Id. 
at 1041, 895 P.2d at 1234. "[P]roximate cause is one of fact to be submitted to the 
jury and not a question of law for the court; if, upon all the facts and 
circumstances, there is a reasonable chance or likelihood of the conclusions of 
reasonable [people] differing, the question is one for the jury." Id. (quoting 
Alegria, 101 Idaho at 619-20,619 P.2d at 137-38). 
Thus, the issue of causation is an Issue for the jury to determine except in only the most 
extraordinary of circumstances. The court in Cramer discusses the proper analysis to be applied 
when two potentially negligent actors exist: 
The district court correctly found that ICRM had a duty to inform Curt of his HIV 
positive status and that ICRM breached that duty. Further, ICRM negligently 
failed to recommend Curt to counseling and treatment for the disease, which 
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would have reduced or eliminated any subsequent negligence by Dr. Swanson. 
ICRM was in a position to prevent the ultimate result in this case by properly 
diagnosing and treating Curt; ICRM breached its duty to Curt and should not be 
relieved of its responsibility for that breach merely because Dr. Swanson 
subsequently engaged in foreseeable negligent conduct. In accordance with 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 457, subsequent medical negligence is generally 
foreseeable. Although ICRM's potential liability will be reduced by a 
determination of any comparative negligence of Dr. Swanson pursuant to I.C. § 
6-801, the comparative negligence statute does not reduce the foreseeability of 
Curt's injury; it merely reduces the liability of ICRM if the jury determines that 
Curt's death was proximately caused by ICRM's breach. Whether ICRM's actions 
proximately caused Curt's death is a question of fact for the jury. This Court 
reverses the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of ICRM and 
holds that questions of fact exist as to whether ICRM proximately caused Curt's 
death. 146 Idaho at 876-877. 
Given that Cramer; Lundy v. Hazen, 90 Idaho 323, 411 P.2d 768 (1966); and Hayes v. 
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 143 Idaho 204, 141 P.3d 1073 (2006) all point to causation being a factual 
issue for the jury to determine, summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim based on causation was 
not proper. See Walenta v. Mark Means Co., 87 Idaho 543, 548, 394 P.2d 329 (Idaho 
1964) (Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause 
without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of 
the causes, and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons . . . 
Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce injuries, a person is not relieved from 
liability because he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that his negligence is 
an efficient proximate cause, without which the injury would not have resulted, ... It is no 
defense to anyone of the several defendants that the injury would not have resulted from his 
negligence alone, without the concurrent negligence or wrongful act of the other defendant." 
Ordinarily, the jury must determine whether the factual situation presented constitutes an 
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intervening efficient cause relied upon to prevent the negligence charged from being the 
proximate cause.). 
The record does not contain any discussion of the elements governmg superseding, 
intervening cause as set forth in the Cramer case. The case law demonstrates that causation is a 
factual issue here to be determined by the jury, even where there are multiple potential causes 
from the negligence of different actors at different times. Overwhelmingly, the cases cited to by 
the parties on the issue of superseding cause have held that it is a factual question to be resolved 
by the jury. Further, the district court, without any supporting evidence in the record, determined 
that the poke, puncture, or prick was essential to the mycobacterial infection. Dr. Chandler's 
affidavit filed on August 7, 2013, demonstrates that a "puncture" is irrelevant to the causation of 
Plaintiff's injuries. (CR000342-CR000344). 
The district court acknowledged that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the 
element of causation, as well as each element of Plaintiff's negligence claim against Defendant. 
(CR000366). However, the district court erred initially in granting summary judgment on the 
issue of causation, and did not reverse its ruling granting summary judgment, albeit the district 
court stated an alternative ground for granting the summary judgment motion. Plaintiff has 
briefed this issue so that no confusion exists as to whether Plaintiff has demonstrated a genuine 
issue of material fact as to the causation element and so that this Court's determination becomes 
law of the case on remand. 
Therefore, summary judgment is improper as to Plaintiff's claim for negligence against 
Defendant. Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court find that Plaintiff has demonstrated a 
genuine issue of material fact as to the causation element of her negligence claim. 
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B. The Issue of Whether Plaintiff Properly Asserted a Cause of Action for 
Negligence Against Defendant Was Raised Sua Sponte By the Court on the 
Motion to Reconsider, Which Was Improper. 
The issue of whether Plaintiff properly stated a negligence cause of action against 
Defendant was never raised at any time by Defendant. The first time that issue appeared at the 
trial court level was in the district court's Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider Prior 
Order Granting Summary Judgment on Count I as a basis for granting summary judgment in 
favor of Defendant. (CR000366-CR000367). The raising of this issue sua csponte by the district 
court as a basis for granting summary judgment was error. 
As noted above, a district court may not decide an issue not raised in the moving party's 
motion for summary judgment. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, 126 Idaho 527, 530-531, 887 P.2d 
1034 (1994); P HH Mortgage Services Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 641, 200 P.3d 1180 
(2009); Sirius LC v. Erickson, 144 Idaho 38, 43, 156 P.3d 539 (2007). In Thomson, the trial court 
granted summary judgment on the issue of causation in a negligence action although the 
defendant had never raised that issue as a basis for granting summary jUdgment in its motion. 
Thomson, 126 Idaho at 530-531. "This Court recently held that the party responding to a 
summary judgment motion is not required to present evidence on every element of his or her 
case at that time, but rather must establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the element 
or elements challenged by the moving party's motion. Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. 
Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 273, 869 P.2d 1365, 1368 (1994). Thus, with respect to the present 
case, we hold that because the defendants did not raise the issue of proximate causation in their 
motion and supporting evidentiary material, the Thomsons were not required to address this 
element of negligence even though they will ultimately have to prove it at trial." It is improper 
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for a district court to grant summary judgment on an issue it raises sua sponte, which the moving 
party does not assert as a basis for his or her motion. ld at 531. 
The district court erred in deciding Defendant's motion for summary judgment based on 
an issue never before raised by the parties. Defendant never asserted that Plaintiff failed to plead 
a negligence claim against her. Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court reverse the district 
court's grant of summary judgment in Defendant's favor and remand the case for further 
proceedings consistent herewith. 
C. Plaintiff Properly Pled a Cause of Action Against Defendant For Negligence. 
In the alternative to her arguments set forth in Subsection B above, Plaintiff maintains 
that she properly pled a cause of action against Defendant, and the district court erred in 
determining that she had not properly pled her negligence action. 
I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1) states that a "pleading which sets forth a claim for relief ... shall 
contain ... (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief in 
the alternative or of several different types may be demanded." See also Myers v. A.o. Smith 
Harvestore Prods., Inc., 114 Idaho 432, 439, 757 P.2d 695 (Ct. App. 1988). 
Idaho's Rules of Civil Procedure provide a system for notice pleading. Youngblood v. 
Higbee, 145 Idaho 665, 668, 182 P.3d 1199 (2008). All pleadings shall be so construed as to do 
substantial justice. Id, See also LR.C.P. 8(t). Further, LR.C.P. 8(e)(I) provides that "Each 
averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms of pleading or 
motions are required." Reynolds v. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 362, 766 P.2d 
1243 (1988). 
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Plaintiff properly placed Defendant on notice that a claim for negligence was being 
asserted against her and that her negligence was a cause of Plaintiff's injuries. Nowhere in 
Plaintiff's Complaint does she aver that a "puncture" was or was not a critical and indispensable, 
precipitating factor in causing her injuries or damages. Plaintiff stated in her Complaint that 
"[ o]n or about April 19, 2010, Plaintiff was a customer at Defendant Peabody's facility, Finger 
Print Day Spa, and she had gone there for the purpose of obtaining a pedicure. Plaintiff's 
pedicure included various procedures on her feet and soaking her feet in basins used, maintained, 
and serviced at Defendant Peabody's facility. During the pedicure Plaintiff's right big toe was 
punctured or otherwise injured by an instrument or instruments being used to perform the 
pedicure. Defendant Linda Cook performed the pedicure on the date of the incident at Defendant 
Peabody's facility." (CR000008). This statement does not indicate that the "puncture" was the 
precipitating or critical element to Plaintiff contracting a mycobacterial infection. It does state 
that there were potentially multiple causes of Plaintiff's injuries. 
Plaintiff went on to state in her Complaint that "Defendants, individually or jointly and 
severally, were negligent in causing injury and damage to Plaintiff as a result of the performance 
of the pedicure; in failing to warn Plaintiff of the potential risks involved in the pedicure 
procedure and in failing to keep tools and instruments in a safe and usable condition to avoid 
injury or infection to Plaintiff and others for whom they performed pedicure procedures; and 
otherwise failing to maintain the premises, facility, equipment, and working conditions in a safe 
and reasonably prudent manner to avoid injury or infection to Plaintiff and others for whom they 
performed pedicure procedures ... By reason of said conduct of the Defendants and as a 
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proximate result thereof, Plaintiff has suffered severe physical and economic injuries and other 
damages." (CR000008-CR000009). 
Again, these statements properly placed Defendant on notice of claim for negligence 
against her, including the element of causation. Plaintiff is not required parse our technical or 
medical opinions as to causation in the allegations of her Complaint. She is only required to 
place Defendant on notice of a negligence claim against her. The district court erred in 
attempting to place a hyper technical requirement on Plaintiff's Complaint, rather than a notice 
pleading standard, and then construed Plaintiff's Complaint beyond what it actually states in 
finding a basis for granting Defendant's summary judgment motion. 
The district court appears to hold that Dr. Chandler's expert opinions on causation do not 
match the statements set forth in Plaintiff's Complaint. Plaintiff maintains that such a conclusion 
does not square with the language of her Complaint, as demonstrated by the quoted language 
above. Nevertheless, Plaintiff is entitled to set forth in her Complaint multiple statements in the 
alternative or hypothetically, so long as they have some basis in fact. 
l.R.C.P. 8(e)(2) states that "A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or 
defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate counts or 
defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alternative and one of them if made 
independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of 
one or more of the alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate claims or 
defenses as the party has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal or on equitable 
grounds or on both." See also MK. Transp., Inc. v. Grover, 101 Idaho 345, 350, 612 P.2d 1192 
(1980); Bondy v. Levy, 119 Idaho 961, 964, 812 P.2d 268 (1991). 
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Plaintiff is entitled to set forth in her Complaint multiple statements and claims regarding 
the causation of her injuries and damages where mUltiple potentially negligent actors existed and 
where multiple potential causes of her injuries existed. That Plaintiff subsequently presented 
expert testimony that demonstrated that the "puncture" that occurred from the act of one of the 
potential tortfeasors was not material to Plaintiff contracting a mycobacterial infection is not a 
proper basis for determining (1) that Plaintiff's pleading is insufficient as a matter of law or (2) 
that summary judgment as to a negligence claim set forth in that pleading is proper. 
Further, Defendant never complained of any defect in Plaintiff's pleading. Defendant 
never filed a motion for a more definite statement under LR.C.P. 12(e), which allows the 
responding party to point out defects in a pleading and request additional details if the pleading is 
so vague or ambiguous that the responding party cannot reasonably frame a responsive pleading. 
Defendant never took any of the above actions because she knew she had been placed on notice 
of a negligence claim against her. She moved for summary judgment on that claim. 
The district court cited Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Products, 139 Idaho 172, 178, 75 
P.3d 733 (2003) as the basis for its determination that Plaintiff had not properly pled a cause of 
action for negligence. Edmondson is inapposite on the issue for which it is cited. In Edmondson, 
the plaintiff admitted that he had not pled the cause of action in his complaint and that it was 
raised for the first time in response to the defendant's summary judgment motion. Id. at 179. It 
cannot reasonably be argued that Plaintiff did not assert a cause of action for direct negligence 
against Defendant in her Complaint. The plain wording of the Complaint, as set forth above, 
demonstrates that Plaintiff asserted a direct negligence claim. Defendant moved for summary 
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judgment on that claim. Edmondson is inapplicable to either the facts or legal issue presented by 
the district court's granting of Defendant's summary judgment motion. 
The district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant on the basis 
that Plaintiff had not properly pled a cause of action for negligence against Defendant. Plaintiff 
respectfully requests that this Court find that Plaintiff properly placed Defendant on notice of a 
negligence claim against her, reverse the district court's order granting summary judgment in 
favor of Defendant, and remand this action for further proceedings consistent therewith. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court find (1) that genuine issues of material fact 
exist as to the causation element of Plaintiff's negligence claim against Defendant; (2) that the 
district court erred in granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's negligence claim against 
Defendant because the district court erred in sua sponte raising the issue of a defect in Plaintiff's 
Complaint; and (3) that no defect exists in Plaintiff's Complaint and that it properly states a 
cause of action for negligence against Defendant. Plaintiff requests this Court reverse the district 
court's granting of Defendant's summary judgment motion as to the direct negligence claim 
against Defendant and remand this action to the district court for further proceedings consistent 
therewith. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of January, 2014. 
JACOBSON & JACOBSON, PLLC 
Ja es F. Jacobso 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 21st day of January, 2014, a true and COlTCCt copy of 
the foregoing was served upon the follow attorneys of record via method below: 
David W. Knotts; Tracy L. Wright 
Carey Perkins, LLP 
Capitol Park Plaza 
300 N. 6th Street, Ste. 200 
P. O. Box 519 
Boise, ID 83701 
Attorneys for Defendant , Stacie 
Peabody and Fingerprints Day Spa 
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